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READING LEGISLATION AND IVOR 
RICHARDSON 
J J McGrath* 
I INTRODUCTION 
In this paper, I endeavor to compare approaches to statutory interpretation in New 
Zealand in the early 1960s with those prevalent in the year 2000.  I do so with particular 
reference to the judgments of Sir Ivor Richardson who will retire as President of the Court 
of Appeal of New Zealand on 24 May 2002.  At my starting point Sir Ivor was in private 
practice in Invercargill, but in June 1963 he moved to Wellington and took up a position as 
Crown Counsel in the Crown Law Office. 
I first met Sir Ivor in 1967, when he became Professor of English and New Zealand Law 
at Victoria University of Wellington and taught me taxation law.  A number of those who 
participated in his most stimulating Master's level tax classes at that time are present here 
today.  My own other legal associations with him since have included opposing him, soon 
after I entered practice, as counsel in a tax case, in the High Court.1  I have also appeared 
before him many times over the past 24 years in the Court of Appeal.  For eleven years I 
did so myself as counsel appearing on behalf of the Crown's interest. 
More recently, for nearly two years, I have been Sir Ivor's junior colleague in the Court 
of Appeal during the final period of his presidency.  As many present will know, serving 
under his judicial leadership has been a very special experience for me.  I will not dwell on 
our other associations, including those as members of the Council of this University, but 
given what I have said, you will appreciate that I feel greatly privileged to be invited to 
contribute to this celebration of Sir Ivor's career in the law. 
  
*  Judge of the Court of Appeal of New Zealand.  The author acknowledges the helpful comments 
on this paper in draft by Justice Keith and Grant Liddell and the research assistance of Trudie 
Griffin and Thomas Geuther. 
1 Dobbs v Inland Revenue Commissioner (NZ) (1974) 4 ATR 221 (HC). 
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II OBJECT OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 
Parliament has "full power to make laws".2 The Judges' role is to interpret and apply 
them in the course of determining issues raised by court proceedings.  In doing so they are 
of course bound by their oath to make decisions according to the law. 
Behind this clear cut and uncontroversial statement of the role of judges lies a difficulty 
which is at the heart of statutory interpretation.  Words are not precise instruments for 
conveying ideas and any written text of substance has the potential to raise problems over 
the meaning of the words used.  Ambiguity can arise both from within words individually, 
from their linkage with other words and from the context in which words are used. 
Of course good procedures in developing and presenting a text can reduce the scope 
for alternative possible meaning of words in it.  So can the skills of a good drafter.  New 
Zealand readers of legislation have reason to be grateful here for the work of the Office of 
Parliamentary Counsel, including its recent initiatives in the presentation of legislation, the 
Law Commission, and the Legislation Advisory Committee, in particular in the 
formulation of principles for legislation.3  But the reality is that neither systems nor people 
can anticipate all the situations to which legislation will be applied.  The content of current 
legislation is, in most cases, necessarily general.  Statute rules applicable to the whole 
community, or to large sections of it, must be drafted to be applied in circumstances which 
cannot be precisely anticipated let alone specified.  As well history shows us it is beyond 
intellectual ingenuity to frame legislation using words in a way which avoids differing 
impressions of their meaning. There are, furthermore, practical problems of drafting 
legislation in New Zealand, including the need to secure the necessary political approval 
from conflicting political interests of coalition governments generally produced by the 
Mixed Member Proportional (MMP) electoral system, coupled with the unrelenting 
urgency in which the task is constantly performed. 
It is the inevitability of ambiguity, in the sense of different possible meanings of words 
in statutes, that gives rise to the need for principled interpretation of statute law by the 
courts.  The object is always to ascertain the meaning of the words Parliament has used.  
To the extent that the words being considered are capable of different meanings, courts 
  
2 Constitution Act 1986, s 15. 
3  New Zealand Law Commission The Format of Legislation (NZLC R27, Wellington, 1993); New 
Zealand Law Commission Legislation Manual: Structure and style (NZLC R35, Wellington, 1996), 
New Zealand Law Commission A New Interpretation Act To Avoid "Prolixity and Tautology" 
(NZLC, R17, Wellington, 1990); New Zealand Legislative Advisory Committee Legislation 
Advisory Committee Guidelines: Guidelines on Process and Content of Legislation (Department of 
Justice, Wellington, 2001); <http://www.pco.parliament.govt.nz/Projects/format/ 
survey.htm> (last accessed 28 June 2002). 
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endeavour to ascertain in a principled way which of them is the more probable meaning.  
This is the presumed meaning sometimes described as the "legal meaning".4  It involves in 
my view ascertaining what the words mean rather than a concept of what the legislators 
had in mind.  Over the centuries different approaches have been followed by Judges to 
their task of interpreting the legislation.  In New Zealand there was a major shift in judicial 
approach over the last forty years of the twentieth Century.  Sir Ivor was a central judicial 
figure in that shift and accordingly features prominently in my discussion. 
III APPROACHES TO INTERPRETATION IN 1960 
Those of us who commenced our acquaintance with principles of statutory 
interpretation at law schools in New Zealand in the early 1960s were quickly exposed to 
criticism of the approaches to statutory interpretation then being applied by the New 
Zealand courts.  In particular two articles were written at this time by Mr D A S Ward, 
then the Law Draftsman, the position now known as Chief Parliamentary Counsel.5 They 
were influential in the teaching of statutory interpretation and gave a generally accurate 
picture of judicial ambivalence concerning the correct approach to statutory language at 
that time.   
Ward's first article6 was a piece of empirical research.  It was commissioned as part of a 
research project in which he examined reported judgments to discover whether there had 
been changes to the courts' approach to interpretation of legislation over the previous 20 or 
30 years.  His inquiry was into whether there was evidence that social and economic 
changes and the development of the welfare state had impacted on judicial attitudes to 
interpretation.   
He identified the three main approaches to interpretation currently used by the New 
Zealand Courts as being the literal rule, the golden rule and the mischief rule.  Under the 
literal rule plain and unambiguous words in statutes were to be construed in their 
ordinary sense.  This raised issues as to what was plain.  The golden rule provided a gloss 
on the literal rule.  If application of the literal rule gave rise to an interpretation which was 
absurd the judge would modify it.  This raised the question of what was an absurdity.  
Finally, there was the mischief rule, developed from principles laid down by Lord Coke in 
  
4  Francis Bennion Understanding Common Law Legislation: Drafting and Interpretation (Oxford 
University Press, New York, 2001) 18.  
5  Denzil AS Ward "Trends in the Interpretation of Statutes" (1957) 2 VUWLR 155; [1958] NZLJ 326 
and 342; Denzil AS Ward "A Criticism of the Interpretation of Statutes in the New Zealand 
Courts" [1963] NZLJ 293. 
6  Ward, above. 
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Heydon's case.7  It required that statutes be construed as remedial of the mischief they were 
enacted to cure. The principles were said by Lord Coke to have been laid down by the 
Barons of the Exchequer for the sure and true interpretation of all statutes in general "be 
they penal or beneficial; restorative or enlarging of the common law".8 The main practical 
question raised by the mischief rule was how the mischief concerned was to be 
ascertained. 
Ward's view was that New Zealand Courts in 1958, on the whole, were tending to 
apply the literal rule and the mischief rule and where the outcome was considered 
inappropriate they would apply one of the presumptions of interpretation.  No single one 
of these approaches was more favoured than others.  Courts rather appeared to invoke 
whichever rule produced a result in accord with the Judge's perception of the justice of the 
case before the court.  Usually Judges gave no reasons for their choice of approach and at 
times even failed to indicate which rule or cannons had guided them. 
The principal criticism Ward made of this rather ad hoc approach was that the Courts 
were failing to apply, consistently, the statutory direction on interpretation given in the 
Acts Interpretation Act 1924 and in particular by section5(j) of that Act.  It provided: 
5. General rules of construction-The following provisions shall have effect in relation to every 
Act of the General Assembly, except in cases where it is otherwise specially provided: 
(j) Every Act, and every provision or enactment thereof, shall be deemed remedial, 
whether its immediate purport is to direct the doing of anything Parliament deems to be 
for the public good, or to prevent or punish the doing of anything it deems contrary to 
the public good, and shall accordingly receive such fair, large, and liberal construction 
and interpretation as will best ensure the attainment of the object of the Act and of such 
provision or enactment according to its true intent, meaning, and spirit: 
Ward pointed out that section 5(j), which had first been enacted in the Interpretation 
Act 1888, was "a modern version of the mischief rule in statutory form".9  His main point 
was that the provision was a positive statutory direction to apply that approach to 
interpretation unless it was "otherwise specially provided"10 in any Act.  The Privy 
Council in 1904 in a judgment delivered by Lord Lindley had said that application of the 
literal rule "to defeat the plain intention of the Legislature instead of construing the words 
  
7  Heydon's case (1584) 3 Co Rep 7a; 76 ER 638 (Ex Ch). 
8  Ward, above, 327. 
9  Ward, above 327. 
10  Acts Interpretation Act 1924, s 5(j). 
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to give effect to that intention was to run counter to (section 5(j))".11 Nevertheless, Ward's 
research indicated the Courts were making use of section 5(j) in only a minority of cases, 
preferring to rely on statements of principles in English textbooks on statutory 
interpretation, and the classic judicial statements of canons of interpretation that had been 
developed in England over the centuries.  There was no equivalent to section 5(j) in the 
Interpretation Act of the United Kingdom at that time nor indeed has there ever been.  
Ward argued that, properly applied, section 5(j) would preclude application of common 
law principles such as that penal acts and taxing acts should be interpreted strictly.  Resort 
by Judges to English textbooks was preventing proper application of section 5(j).  He 
concluded his first paper with this summary of his views:12 
 
The fair, large and liberal construction rule laid down by s5(j) of the Acts Interpretation Act 
1924 is not applied in all cases.  It is not even applied in a majority of cases.  Other rules laid 
down by that Act are not always applied when they should be.  It need hardly be said that the 
responsibility for this situation rests mainly on counsel. 
Ward returned to his theme in his second paper which he delivered at the 1963 New 
Zealand Law Society Conference.13 In it he developed the view that it was necessary for 
the Courts, in the interpretation of legislation, and in deciding whether statutory language 
applied to the facts of a given case, to ascertain the intent and object of the Act.14 Having 
done so a Court was in a position to apply "a fair, large and liberal construction"15 as 
would best attain the object according to its true intent, meaning and spirit.  Section 5(j) 
required that approach. 
The "object intent and spirit"16 were generally to be discovered by a careful study of the 
Act.  Where they remained elusive there was room for application of the canons of 
construction but only, to the extent they were consistent with section 5(j).  Ward also 
adhered to the traditional view that it was inappropriate to ascertain the true meaning and 
spirit by any reference to the Parliamentary history.   
He concluded this paper by reiterating that New Zealand Courts remained inconsistent 
in their attitude to statutory interpretation and with few exceptions were not approaching 
 
11  Smith v McArthur [1904] AC 389, 395, 398 (HL) Lord Lindley. 
12 Ward, above, 344. 
13  Denzil AS Ward "A Criticism of the Interpretation of Statutes in the New Zealand Courts" [1963] 
NZLJ 293.  
14  Ward, above, 294.  
15  Ward, above, 296. 
16 Ward, above, 293, 297. 
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it in the way Parliament had directed.17  Section 5(j) was, he felt, being ignored by the 
Courts.  In case anyone missed the point he abandoned his earlier courtesy of blaming 
counsel for this state of affairs. 
Views expressed during the discussion of the second paper at the Law Conference 
ranged from Mr Cooke's view that there was great attraction in the suggestion the Courts 
should use a freer hand in approaching statutes18 to Mr Dugdale's observation that if he 
were in Mr Ward's position as Chief Parliamentary Counsel he "would not be rooting for 
section 5(j) becoming more fashionable but would be wanting to repeal the jolly thing".19  
Mr Ward diplomatically promised to bear that suggestion in mind.20  One pertinent 
observation made during the discussion was that application of section 5(j) was unlikely of 
itself to produce different results in many cases unless the courts were prepared to look at 
Parliamentary debates and similar material.21 
Ward only touched on why judges in 1960 were largely ignoring the purposive 
approach of section 5(j).  He did however in both papers refer to an earlier internationally 
well known and highly perceptive criticism of current judicial technique in interpretation 
written in 1938 by Professor John Willis of Dalhousie Law School.22  
Willis had been blunt.  He argued that in statutory interpretation courts invoke rules 
that satisfied their sense of justice in the case before them.23  To do this they treated all 
three rules of interpretation as valid, choosing from the literal, golden or mischief rule 
whichever the occasion demanded but, he thought understandably, never giving reasons 
for their choice.24  As a result the important practical question for lawyers, which of the 
three approaches will the court adopt, did not admit of a principled answer.25 
Willis had strong views on the place of the canons of legislative intent in judicial 
interpretation of statutes.  Consistent with his main theme he opined that judicial addiction 
to these ancient presumptions had nothing to do with ascertaining the intent of the 
  
17  Ward, above, 299. 
18  Ward, above, 300. 
19  Ward, above, 301. 
20  Ward, above, 302. 
21  Ward, above, 300. 
22  Professor John Willis "Statute Interpretation in a Nutshell" (1938) 16 Can Bar Rev 1, 16. 
23  Willis, above. 
24  Willis, above. 
25  Willis, above 
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legislature and everything to do with controlling that intent.26  In his view judicial 
approaches to interpretation had become a common law Bill of Rights for Commonwealth 
judges.27  Reading between the lines of his own papers it seems clear that Ward agreed 
with the Willis analysis and disapproved of the judicial practice.  His concern was of a 
constitutional kind, reflecting the imperative of democratic principle.  The Judges should 
interpret and give effect to legislation in the manner Parliament had directed. 
Ten years after Willis wrote "Statute Interpretation in a Nutshell" Justice Frankfurter of 
the United States Supreme Court delivered his famous lecture.28  For Frankfurter statutes 
were instruments of policy arising out of specific situations and addressed to attainment of 
particular ends.  Legislation accordingly always had an aim and a policy which was 
evinced in the language of the statute, as read in light of other external manifestations of its 
purpose.  That, in his opinion, is what the Judge should seek to give effect to when 
interpreting the statute.  Frankfurter distrusted reference to seeking the "intention" of the 
legislature as such.  He quoted Justice Holmes as saying:  "I don't care what their intention 
was, I only want to know what they mean."29 
Frankfurter also rejected the English rules of construction as too simplistic.30  The 
rigidity of interpreting language merely by reading it disregarded the fact that acts were 
like organisms which exist in their environment.31  He was well informed on English legal 
history, expressing approval of the resolutions in Heydon's case and the practice of 
including explicit recitals in early English legislation to define the mischief to which an 
enactment was directed.32  That practice had ceased but Frankfurter noted that Professor 
Laski had urged that the old practice of including preambles in legislation should be 
restored, or a memorandum of explanation prepared which would be read with the 
proposed legislation.33   
In the United States, according to Frankfurter, as the area of governmental regulation 
widened, the impact of the legislative process had increasingly compelled Judges in the 
  
26  Willis, above, 17. 
27  Willis, above, 17. 
28  Felix Frankfurter "Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes" (1947) 47 Colum L Rev 527. 
29 Frankfurter, above, 538. 
30  Frankfurter, above, 541. 
31  Frankfurter, above. 
32  Frankfurter, above, 541-542 
33  Harold Laski "Note to the Report of the Committee on Minister's Powers (1932), Cmd 4060, 
Annex V, 135. 
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course of interpretation to give consideration of all that convincingly illuminated an 
enactment.  As he put it:34   
Legislative reports were increasingly drawn upon statements by those in charge of legislation, 
reports of investigating committees, recommendations of agencies entrusted with enforcement 
of the laws, etc etc. 
and later:35 
Courts examine the forms rejected in favour of the words chosen.  They look at later statutes 
"considered to throw a cross light" on an earlier enactment…  The consistent construction by 
an administrative agency charged with effectuating the policy of an enactment causes very 
considerable weight. 
Nevertheless he accepted that some caution in this approach was required.  A detailed 
report by a legislative committee bearing on the immediate question may settle a matter, 
but a loose statement, even by the committee's chairman made impromptu in the heat of 
debate would not.36  Above all in his view: "while the courts are no longer confined to the 
language they are confined by it."37 
IV SCHEME AND PURPOSE AND SECTION 5J 
When Professor Richardson began his lectures on statutory interpretation to the Legal 
System class at Victoria University he provided students with references to section 108 of 
the Land and Income Tax Act 1954, the general anti-avoidance provision; and the 
judgment of Woodhouse J in Elmiger v Commissioner of Inland Revenue,38 a case which he 
had argued successfully for the Crown.  In his judgment Woodhouse J said that since 
1930:39   
There has been a growing awareness by the Legislature and the Courts alike that ingenious 
legal devices contrived to enable individual taxpayers to minimise or avoid their tax liabilities 
are often not merely sterile or unproductive in themselves (except perhaps in respect of their 
tax advantages for the taxpayer concerned), but that they have social consequences which are 
contrary to the general public interest.  
  
34 Frankfurter, above, 542. 
35  Frankfurter, above, 543. 
36  Frankfurter, above. 
37  Frankfurter, above. This extract is cited in Tertiary Institutes Allied Staff Association Inc v Tahana 
[1998] 1 NZLR 41, 53 (CA). 
38  Elmiger v Commissioner of Inland Revenue [1966] NZLR 683 (SC). 
39 Elmiger, above, 686-687. 
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The case would presumably have indicated to Sir Ivor and his students the importance 
of a purposive approach to the anti-avoidance provision.  Whether or not that is so, as we 
shall see, in his subsequent judicial career Justice Richardson has made plain where he 
stands on that question. 
Sir Ivor Richardson has been at the forefront of the move over the last 25 years in the 
New Zealand courts to give the purposive approach a dominant place in statutory 
interpretation.  He recognises that the interpretative approach taken by different Judges at 
different times will depend on their perceptions of community values and attitudes in their 
own society.40  But, as he said in his Wilfred Fullagar Memorial Lecture in 1985:41 
In New Zealand one test and one test only is mandated by statute.  Under our Acts 
Interpretation Act we are required – and have been since 1888 – to accord to every Act and 
every statutory provision such fair, large and liberal interpretation as will best ensure the 
attainment of the object of the legislation according to its true intent, meaning and spirit.  
This view has been reiterated by him judicially, for example in R v Kahu,42 where 
Richardson J delivered the judgment of Cooke P, himself, Casey and Hardie Boys JJ 
(McKay J dissenting) describing section 5(j) as giving a statutory mandate to the courts to 
adopt a purposive approach.   
The application of section 5(j), in Sir Ivor's view, requires the New Zealand Courts to 
consider the public policies which the legislation serves.  This is at the heart of his own 
philosophy of interpretation which he spelt out in an address earlier in 1985 in his paper 
on "Appellate Court Responsibilities and Tax Avoidance."43  He stated:44 
The twin pillars on which our approach to statutes rests are the scheme of the legislation and 
the purpose of the legislation.  Consideration of the scheme of the legislation requires a careful 
reading in its historical context of the whole Act including the long title, analysing its structure 
and examining the relationship between the various provisions, and recognising any 
discernible themes and patterns and underlying policy considerations.  It presupposes that in 
that way the study of the statute or of the group of sections may assist in the interpretation of a 
particular provision in its statutory context.  It may provide a detailed guide to the intentions 
  
40  Rt Hon Sir Ivor Richardson "Interpretation of Statutes" (Paper presented for the Wilfred Fullagar 
Memorial lecture, Monash University, Melbourne, 1985).  
41  Rt Hon Justice Richardson "Judges as Lawmakers in the 1990s" (Wilfred Fullagar Memorial 
lecture) (1986) 12 Monash University LR 35, 36. 
42  R v Kahu [1995] 2 NZLR 3 (CA). 
43  Sir Ivor Richardson "Appellate Court Responsibilities and Tax Avoidance" (1985) 2 Aust For 3. 
44  Richardson, above, 8. 
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of the framers of the legislation and in so doing may cast light on the meaning of the provision 
in question.  Certainly that seems to me a preferable means of ascertaining the purpose or 
purposes of a provision rather than attempting to elicit it simply from consideration of the 
language of the section in isolation.  
Of course, he acknowledges that the purposive approach can present difficulties, in 
particular where a statute is lengthy and complex, reflects numerous compromises and 
incorporates amendments by different drafters enacted over many years.45  Such 
legislation squarely raises the traditional difficulty of how is the mischief to be 
ascertained? Sir Ivor has encountered that dilemma principally in income tax legislation.  
He considers that, despite its complexity, it is not difficult to discern from the Inland 
Revenue Acts the basic features of income tax and to consider the statutory provisions in 
light of their history and how they fit into the scheme of the legislation.46 
The application of this approach can be seen in Sir Ivor's earliest appellate judgments.  
For example in 1979 a Court comprising Woodhouse, Cooke and Richardson JJ47 had 
considered a number of appeals from the early Supreme Court decisions concerning the 
property sharing regime that had been enacted by the Matrimonial Property Act 1976.  
Typically what was at issue was whether their respective shares were to be determined in 
accordance with contributions to the marriage partnership.  The Judges concerned took a 
common view of the Act although generally delivering individual judgments.  Richardson 
J, in his analysis, discerned policy objectives in the new legislation which led him to 
emphasise strongly the theme of equal sharing and to take a restrictive view of the 
circumstances in which there might be departure from it. He described the new Act as 
"social legislation of the widest general application"48 and emphasised the importance of it 
being interpreted "to identify in the clearest of terms the property to be subject to the 
sharing regime".49 
His view of the remedial scope of the purposive approach is also illustrated in the 
judgment of the majority in R v Kahu.50  This case concerned a provision in the Children, 
Young Persons and their Families Act 1989 authorising the issue of a warrant empowering 
  
45  Richardson "Appellate Court Responsibilities and Tax Avoidance", above, 9. 
46  Richardson, above. 
47  Martin v Martin [1979] 1 NZLR 97, 108-112 (CA). 
48  Reid v Reid [1979] 1 NZLR 572, 605 (CA). 
49  Reid, above. 
50  R v Kahu [1995] 2 NZLR 3 (CA). 
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the Police or a Social Worker to search for a child and to enter a dwellinghouse for that 
purpose. 
A social worker had entered a dwellinghouse under a warrant accompanied by a police 
officer.  After checking the physical state of the children of the household the social worker 
asked to look in kitchen cupboards to check there was food there.  On doing so cannabis 
was found.  The issue was whether there was due authority for the search of the kitchen 
cupboards.  The majority (Cooke P, Richardson, Casey and Hardie Boys JJ) held there was.  
McKay J dissented.  In delivering the judgment of the majority Richardson J said:51 
That construction and conclusion reflect the statutory mandate to the Courts under s5(j) of the 
Acts Interpretation Act 1924 to adopt a purposive approach to the interpretation of the 
legislation so as to best ensure the attainment of the object of the provision according to its true 
intent, meaning and spirit.  Allied with that standard approach to interpretation is the 
important consideration, emphasised by this Court in a number of cases of apparent 
deficiencies in the statutory drafting, that the Courts should favour an interpretation that will 
produce a workable result under the legislation.  For those reasons we are satisfied that in 
appropriate circumstances governed by concerns for the welfare of the child as reflected in the 
criteria under s39, the holder of a warrant under s39 may check the supplies of food in the 
house and open cupboards for that purpose.  
This passage can be linked with that of the Court in Northland Milk Ltd v Northland Milk 
Vendors Association52 where, in the context of legislation restructuring the milk distribution 
industry, Cooke P referred to situations where legislation making sweeping changes in a 
field failed to provide for a real problem.  The Court's responsibility then became one of 
working out a practical interpretation appearing to accord best with the general 
Parliamentary intention embodied in the Act.  In doing so: "The Courts can in a sense fill 
gaps in an Act but only in order to make the Act work as Parliament must have 
intended".53   
V THE LANGUAGE OF THE ACT 
Analysis of the statutory scheme to ascertain its purpose is of course simply an 
approach to interpretation which has to be applied to the language of the statute.  In his 
application Sir Ivor typically starts with the ordinary meaning of the words of the text, 
going to dictionaries to identify common usages of particular words and the various 
meanings in which they are used.  These often include Australian and North American 
  
51  Kahu, above, 6. 
52  Northland Milk Ltd v Northland Milk Vendors Association [1988] 1 NZLR 530 (CA). 
53  Northland Milk, above, 583, Cooke P. 
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words reflecting the spread of their influence of usages on colloquial New Zealand 
meaning. 
King-Ansell v Police54 is an early instance of this analytical approach to statutory 
language.  The appellant had been convicted in the Magistrates' Court of publishing a 
pamphlet with intent to incite ill-will against a group of persons "on the ground of their 
ethnic origins".55  In issue was whether Jewish people in New Zealand formed a group 
with common "ethnic origins".  The Court was unanimous that they did.56  In his judgment 
Sir Ivor discussed the expanding meaning of "ethnic" by reference to the Oxford English 
Dictionary, completed by a supplement in 1933, and also to the Supplement which was 
published in 1972.  He referred also to the Heinemann New Zealand Dictionary.  Of a 
submission in that case that the wider meaning was an American aberration not to be 
followed in New Zealand he said:57 
The concern of the Courts being with the New Zealand usage of the English language, New 
Zealand and British dictionaries are for historical and cultural reasons ordinarily likely to be a 
better guide than dictionaries published in North America.  At the same time it needs to be 
recognised that our language has been increasingly influenced in recent time by American 
usages especially through the media and through the use in this country of educational 
materials published in North America.  
The long title of the Race Relations Act 1971 indicated that one of its purposes was to 
implement the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination.  The obligation undertaken by all parties to that Convention to eliminate 
racial discrimination in all its forms was part of the background which had to be borne in 
mind in interpreting the relevant domestic legislation.58 
Richardson J held that:59 
A group is identifiable in terms of its ethnic origins if it is a segment of the population 
distinguished from others by a sufficient combination of shared customs, beliefs, traditions 
and characteristics derived from a common or presumed common past, even if not drawn 
  
54 King-Ansell v Police [1979] 2 NZLR 531, 537-8 (CA) Richardson J. 
55 King-Ansell, above, 531. 
56  This outcome accords with the view on the same point expressed by Lord Lester of Herne Hill 
QC in the context of the United Kingdom legislation enacted in 1965.  See his seminal work:  
Anthony Lester and Geoffrey Bindman Race and Law (Penguin, London, 1972) 156-7. 
57  King-Ansell, above, 540. 
58  King-Ansell, above, 540. 
59  King-Ansell, above, 543. 
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from what in biological terms is a common racial stock.  It is that combination which gives 
them an historically determined social identity in their own eyes and in the eyes of those 
outside the group.  They have a distinct social identity based not simply on group cohesion 
and solidarity but also on their belief as to their historical antecedents. 
His judgment in King-Ansell was followed by the House of Lords in Mandla (Sewa 
Singh) v Dowell Lee60 with passages, including that cited immediately above, as to the 
meaning of "ethnic origins" expressly adopted in the leading speech of Lord Fraser of 
Tullybelton with which three other Law Lords agreed.  Lord Fraser said that if King-Ansell 
had been cited to the Court of Appeal in England "it might well have affected their 
decision".61  
Another example of Sir Ivor's approach to statutory language can be seen in the 
judgment of a Full Court of the Court of Appeal delivered in R v Leitch,62 a case concerning 
the statutory regime for the sentence of preventive detention.  Section 75 of the Criminal 
Justice Act 1985 empowered the High Court to impose this indefinite term sentence on two 
categories of offender, the first those over 21 years who have been convicted of sexual 
violation and secondly those previously convicted since reaching 17 years of age of a wider 
category of specified sexual and other violent crimes who subsequently commit another of 
those specified offences. 
The Court's judgment in Leitch commences with the observation that section 75 reflects 
a fundamental purpose of sentencing, namely the protection of society.  An analysis of 
each subsection follows.  A key passage in section 75(2) qualifying the power to impose the 
sentence requires that the High Court "is satisfied that it is expedient for the protection of 
the public that…(the) offender…should be detained in custody for a substantial 
period…".63  The judgment focuses first on the need to be "satisfied" indicating that this 
called for the exercise of judgment by the sentencing judge.  It meant that the Judge had to 
have made up his or her mind.  It was inapt to qualify the language by importing wider 
notions of degree – such as a standard of proof.64 
Next the judgment considers "expedient".  A computer check had revealed it appeared 
1116 times in the statute book.  While the term carried shades of meaning the basic 
meaning of "expedient" was brought out by references to the Oxford English Dictionary 
  
60 Mandla (Sewa Singh) v Dowell Lee [1983] 2 AC 548 (HL). 
61  Dowell Lee above, 563, Lord Fraser. 
62  R v Leitch (1997) 15 CRNZ 321 (CA). 
63 Leitch, above, 327. 
64 Leitch, above. 
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(2ed), Webster's Third New International Dictionary, Black's Law Dictionary and, closer to 
home, The Macquarie Dictionary.  They observed "expedient" meant was what was "fit or 
suitable for the purpose; proper in the circumstances."  This set a lower threshold than 
"necessary", a conclusion reinforced by consideration of the alternative standard "necessary 
or expedient" (used 411 times in the statute book).65 
Overall the Court concluded that the standard in section 75 was that the sentencing 
Court should be satisfied that, in the circumstances of the case, it was appropriate for the 
protection of the public to detain the offender for a substantial, indefinite period.  The 
judgment went on to list factors likely to be relevant in making that assessment.66  It 
emphasised section 75 was a stand alone sentencing provision setting out standards which 
were not subject of other preconditions or criteria.  Ultimately there was a residual 
discretion in its imposition but that itself could not on the language be fettered by building 
in a rebuttable presumption that a finite sentence was preferable.  All this is derived from 
the language of the provisions concerned read in its immediate context but also in the 
context of the statute book as a whole. 
VI EXTRA-STATUTORY MATERIALS: 
A Legislative History 
It will be recalled that during the discussion on Ward's second paper at the 1963 Law 
Conference the view was expressed by a commentator that a purposive interpretation by 
reference to section 5(j) was not likely to produce different results unless the Courts were 
prepared to look at Parliamentary debates and similar material.67  In 1984 the Court of 
Appeal signalled it was prepared to examine the legislative steps leading up to enactment 
of a Bill.  Until then the Courts, overtly at least, would look only at reports of advisory 
committees or commissions and then solely to determine the mischief that an Act was 
intended to remedy.  They would not consider wider extra statutory material at all.68  
Thus explanatory notes to bills, and amendments made during the course of their passage, 
were excluded territory and even more so what was said in Parliamentary debates. 
  
65 Leitch, above, 328. 
66 Leitch, above. 
67  Denzil AS Ward "A Criticism of the Interpretation of Statutes in the New Zealand Courts" [1963] 
NZLJ 293, 300. 
68  John F Burrows Statute Law in New Zealand (2ed, Butterworths, Wellington, 1999) 165-170. 
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In Marac Life Assurance v Commissioner of Inland Revenue69 both Cooke P and Richardson 
J referred to the Annual Financial Statement of the Minister of Finance to support their view 
that provisions in the Income Tax Amendment Act 1983 did not cover life insurance 
policies.  They did so in passing, without fanfare or detailed explanation, or extensive 
constitutional discussion.  This suggests that it was the disclosure that was novel rather 
than the practice of reference to legislative history itself.  In Australia, in 1984, it had been 
thought necessary to enact legislation to authorise the courts to refer to legislative history.  
In England the House of Lords followed the New Zealand court's approach of judicial 
determination, but after extensive discussion of the issue by the House of Lords in Pepper v 
Hart.70  
Sixteen years after the Marac Life Assurance71 case my own impression of the New 
Zealand courts experience is that Hansard most often assists by indicating the context in 
which the legislation concerned was introduced and enacted.  It gives an insight into what 
those principally responsible for the policy reflected in the legislation had in mind.   Only 
occasionally does Hansard directly assist in clarifying ambiguity in particular language.  
The fuller contextual picture, however, is often very helpful.  Changes made in the text of a 
draft in a Law Commission or other report or in a Bill following its introduction to the 
House in the course of its passage are more often of direct assistance in ascertaining 
meaning than what members say about it. 
B International Standards 
International standards form another category of extra statutory material which can 
assist in application of a purposive approach.  In 1986, in his Fullagar lecture,72 Sir Ivor 
referred to a presumption that Parliament should not be deemed to legislate inconsistently 
with its international obligations – a principle of interpretation which he described as 
seeking to set the legal statute in its international context.  In Commissioner of Inland Revenue 
v JFP Energy73 the principle was applied to achieve the uniform interpretation of 
provisions in a double tax treaty which had become part of New Zealand law. 
  
69  Marac Life Assurance v Commissioner of Inland Revenue [1986] 1 NZLR 674, 701, 708 (CA) Cooke P 
and Richardson J, respectively. 
70  Pepper v Hart  [1983] AC 513 (HL); Also see the discussion in John F Burrows Statute Law in New 
Zealand (2 ed, Butterworths, Wellington, 1999) 167-171.  
71  Marac Life Assurance v Commissioner of Inland Revenue [1986] 1 NZLR 694 (CA). 
72  Sir Ivor Richardson "Judges as Law Makers in the 1900s" (Wilfred Fullagar Memorial Lecture) 
(1986) 12 Monash University LR 35, 46. 
73  Commissioner of Inland Revenue v JFP Energy [1990] 3 NZLR 536 (CA). See also King-Ansell v Police 
[1979] 2 NZLR 531, 540 (CA).  See above. 
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This principle has, of course, since been further developed by the Court of Appeal in 
the immigration cases of Tavita v Minister of Immigration74 and Rajan v Minister of 
Immigration75 and later, substantively, in the more general context of NZ Airline Pilots' 
Association v Attorney-General76 and Wellington District Legal Services Committee v 
Tangiora.77  In the Airline Pilots case, in the judgment delivered by Keith J the Court said:78 
 
We begin with the presumption of statutory interpretation that so far as its wording allows 
legislation should be read in a way which is consistent with New Zealand's international 
obligations, eg Rajan v Minister of Immigration [1996] 3 NZLR 543 at p551.  That presumption 
may apply whether or not the legislation was enacted with the purpose of implementing the 
relevant text.  So this Court in interpreting guardianship legislation enacted to give effect to 
the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction has said that it is 
incumbent on it to construe the Act in a manner that will as far as possible give effect to that 
purpose,  Gross v Boda [1995] 1 NZLR 569 at pp573 and 574.  And it read the general language 
of the Employment Contracts Act 1991 conferring jurisdiction on the Employment Court as not 
overriding the customary international law of sovereign immunity.  In the absence of such an 
approach almost any general statute would displace well-settled doctrines accepted by New 
Zealand in its international relations, Governor of Pitcairn and Associated Islands v Sutton [1995] 1 
NZLR 426 at pp430 and 438.  In that type of case national legislation is naturally being 
considered in the broader international legal context in which it increasingly operates.  
There have since been further developments in the application of this principle which 
are valuably discussed by Treasa Dunworth in "Public International Law".79  
C Further Material bearing on Policy 
More controversially, Sir Ivor has advanced the view that factual material should be 
put before the Court to demonstrate the economic and social implications of alternative 
approaches.  He is concerned that Judges are informed and aware of the likely 
consequences of decisions.  He does not exclude statutory interpretation from the areas in 
which such material may be helpful, in particular to the appellate judge, in choosing 
 
74  Tavita v Minister of Immigration [1994] 2 NZLR 257 (CA). 
75  Rajan v Minister of Immigration [1996] 3 NZLR 543 (CA). 
76  NZ Airline Pilots' Association v Attorney-General [1997] 3 NZLR 269 (CA). 
77  Wellington District Legal Services v Tangiora [1998] 1 NZLR 129 (CA) (affirmed on appeal see 
Tangiora v Wellington District Legal Services [2000] 1 NZLR 17 (PC)). 
78  NZ Airline Pilots' Association, above, 289. 
79  Treasa Dunworth "Public International Law" [2000] NZ Law Rev 217, 221. 
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between available options.  At the same time he acknowledges a need for caution where 
such material has not been subject to trial scrutiny.80 
The first question which arises here is how such material should come before the 
courts.  Under section 42 of the Evidence Act 1908 Judges may properly take judicial notice 
of a wide range of statistical, economic and social data.  Alternatively parties may seek to 
call it at trial or to have it admitted on appeal by leave. 
Under our adversary system there may be no client interest, incentive or adequate 
resources available in a particular case, to enable counsel to explore the wider issues 
arising by making appropriate social inquiries.  In the United States the technique of the 
amicus brief from the government or interested parties not directly involved in the 
litigation has been developed to fill the information gap. 
In New Zealand in 1996 the Court of Appeal in Z v Z (No 2)81 was concerned with 
whether the meaning of "property" in the Matrimonial Property Act 1976 covered the 
future earnings of spouses after their marital relationship had ended.  To assist the Court 
on the range of public interest questions involved the Solicitor-General, at the request of 
the Court, appointed senior and junior counsel as amici.  The intention was to ensure 
relevant contextual material was put before the Court and argument submitted from the 
public interest perspective.  Two groups interested in the future earnings issue were also 
successful in obtaining amicus status to advance their own perspectives.82  The process 
involved was novel in New Zealand, at least in its extent.  It was criticised editorially with 
the Court being accused of stepping outside conventions for judicial decision making.83  
In Drew v Attorney-General84 the Court of Appeal granted an application by the New 
Zealand Council for Civil Liberties to intervene in an appeal concerning judicial review of 
findings against a prison inmate under prison disciplinary processes.  The Court 
emphasised that the principal purpose of litigation was to resolve disputes between 
parties.  Allowing outsiders to participate risked expansion of issues, elongation of 
appellate hearings and extra cost to the parties.  The Court also had to be sensitive to the 
suggestion it was conducting a form of judicial inquiry into policy.  On the other hand the 
appeals raising issues going to the public interest often required the Court to have regard 
  
80  The Rt Hon Justice Richardson "Judges as Law Makers in the 1900s" (Wilfred Fullagar Memorial 
Lecture) (1986) 12 Monash University Law Report, 35, 46. 
81  Z v Z (No. 2) [1997] 2 NZLR 258 (CA). 
82  Z (No. 2), above, 273. 
83  Mark Henaghan "Are Future Earnings Matrimonial Property?" [1996] NZLJ 323. 
84  Drew v Attorney-General [2001] 2 NZLR 428 (CA). 
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to wide implications than those of immediate concern to the parties.  Where assistance 
likely to be offered outweighed detriments to other interests the Court would permit 
intervention.  The application of the New Zealand Council for Civil Liberties was granted 
on the basis it would file a written submission with the question of whether it would be 
heard orally reserved. 
Factual material bearing on arguable alternative meanings of a statute is of course a 
contextual nature.  Like other aspects of the context it can help clarify the meaning of 
statutory language by showing the setting in which it is to be considered.  One reason 
given for why such facts can be considered on appeal, for the first time, is that they are not 
of such a character as to require adjudication at trial.  Professor K C Davis, in his seminal 
discussion, distinguished what he described as legislative facts from adjudicative facts.85  He 
said:86 
When an agency finds facts concerning immediate parties – what the parties did, what the 
circumstances were, what the background conditions were – the agency is performing an 
adjudicative function, and the facts may conveniently be called adjudicative facts.  When an 
agency wrestles with a question of law or policy, it is acting legislatively, just as judges have 
created the common law through judicial legislation, and the facts which inform its legislative 
judgment may conveniently be denominated legislative facts.  The distinction is important;  
the traditional rules of evidence are designed for adjudicative facts, and unnecessary confusion 
results from attempting to apply the traditional rules to legislative facts. 
This distinction underlies the approach of the United States Supreme Court to 
ascertaining the factual contexts where a court or an administrative agency has had to 
determine matters of a "judgmental or predictive nature".87  There is no requirement that 
legislative facts be indisputable before they are admitted.  Davis has expressed that view, 
in 1964, citing the Supreme Court's decision in Borden's Farm Products Co v Baldwin.88  He 
said:89 
  
85  K C Davis "An Approach to Problems of Evidence in the Administrative Process" (1942) 85 Harv 
Law Rev 364. 
86  Davis, above, 402-407. 
87  See Federal Communications Commission v National Citizens Committee for Broadcasting (1978) 436 
US 775, 813-814 citing earlier authorities in support. 
88  Borden's Farm Products Co v Baldwin (1934) 293 US 194. 
89  "A System of Judicial Notice Based on Fairness and Convenience", Perspectives of Law (1964) 69, 
83. 
 READING LEGISLATION AND IVOR RICHARDSON 1035 5 
What the law needs at its growing points is more, not less judicial thinking about the factual 
ingredients of problems of what the law ought to be and the needed facts are seldom "clearly" 
indisputable. 
In Australia, in Gerhardy v Brown Brennan J said: "When a Court in ascertaining the 
validity or scope of a law considers matters of fact, it is not bound to reach its decision in 
the same way as it does when it tries an issue between parties".90 
In a very recent decision of the High Court of Australia McHugh J has endorsed this 
dictum and also expressed approval of an observation in Cross on Evidence that:91 
It is clear from the cases that judges have felt themselves relatively free to apply their own 
views and to make their own enquiries of social ethics, psychology, politics and history where 
relevant without requiring evidence or other proof. 
In the High Court of New Zealand Jeffries J has used the Davis distinction between 
legislative fact, and adjudicative fact, to support a finding that the Indecent Publications 
Tribunal was entitled to assess for itself what amounted to evidence of injury to the public 
good.92 
More recently issues of admissibility of legislative fact material arose in Attorney-
General v Prince and Gardner.93  Proceedings were brought against the Crown seeking 
damages for long term consequences of alleged negligence in placing the plaintiff for 
adoption and, years later, in failing to respond to indications of neglect of him by his 
adoptive parents thereafter.  On appeal against the refusal of the High Court to strike out 
the proceeding, the Crown sought to submit affidavits giving evidence of a predictive 
nature concerning the impacts on social work practice of imposition of any liability in such 
circumstances.  The evidence did not relate to the facts, but concerned assessments of the 
likely impact of imposing liability on the Crown for the then Department of Social Welfare 
in respect of acts and omissions of its social workers in their exercise of powers and 
performance of functions under children and young persons legislation.  Deponents drew 
on their own expert knowledge of the discipline of social work, and in expressing opinions 
also relied on published academic literature which identified effects on the practice of 
  
90  Gerhardy v Brown (1985) 159 CLR 70, 141. 
91  Woods v Multi-Sport Holdings Pty Ltd [2002] HCA 9, para 65.  See also for a different view the 
judgment of Callinan J in the same case at paras 164-165. 
92  Comptroller of Customs v Gordon & Gotch (NZ) Ltd [1987] 2 NZLR 81, 92 (HC) Jeffries J.  The 
principle is now given legislative force by s 4 of the Films, Videos and Publications Classification 
Act 1993. 
93  Attorney-General v Prince & Gardner [1998] 1 NZLR 262 (CA).  The author and Grant Liddell 
appeared  as Counsel for the Attorney-General. 
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social work arising from prospects of liability for negligence or other torts.  Another 
affidavit gave an assessment of the financial impact on provision for the Children and 
Young Persons' Service of what was said to be the substantial increase in investigative 
work that would be required if such governmental liability could exist.   
The appellant sought to have the evidence admitted to assist the Court to be adequately 
informed on the central issue, which was whether the Court should allow liability for 
alleged negligent acts of social works.  The application was strongly, and with some 
success, resisted by counsel for Mr Prince, Robert Chambers QC, who argued that the 
factual material was of a kind that should be evaluated at a trial and should not be 
considered on a strike out application.  A majority (comprising Richardson P, Thomas and 
Keith JJ) in a judgment delivered by Richardson P agreed:94  
It is only where, on the facts alleged in the statement of claim, and however broadly they are 
stated, no private law claim of the kind or kinds advanced can succeed that it is appropriate to 
strike out the proceedings at a preliminary stage.  And in that assessment the public policy 
considerations must be solidly founded in the relevant legislation, other relevant material, or 
the experience of the Courts.  In some cases aspects of policy may require the kind of analysis 
and testing of expert evidence, including evidence of economic and social analysis, that is 
available only at trial.  In other cases, policy considerations are patent.  They may be explicit or 
implicit in the relevant legislation.  They may be reflected in other areas of the law.  Or the 
Courts may for reasons to which we shall come feel the considerations are readily identifiable 
and capable of evaluation and need not be the subject of evidence to be tested at trial. 
However, the majority went on to say:95 
For reasons to which we shall come we are satisfied that there are specific powerful policy 
considerations relating to the adoption which are sufficiently self-evident and when taken 
together require the striking out of those causes of action. 
The majority held that the cause of action based on the later complaint of neglect, but 
not that concerning the circumstances of the adoption, should proceed to trial.  Chambers 
J, writing extra judicially, has since acknowledged the importance of empirical material 
arguing that it should ideally be produced at first instance so that it can be tested for 
reliability.96  
  
94  Prince and Gardner, above, 267-268. 
95  Prince and Gardner, above, 268. 
96  Robert Chambers "Current Sources of Law:  A Commentary" in Rick Bigwood (ed) Legal Method 
in New Zealand (Butterworths, Wellington, 2001) 131, 134-135. 
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There are of course numerous cases in which material bearing on public policy 
assessment, which had not been available to the lower court, has been received on appeal.  
Examples include Creednz v Governor-General,97 where an affidavit was received from the 
Secretary of the Cabinet containing a relevant Cabinet Paper and Taiaroa v Minister of 
Justice98 where in a challenge to the conduct of the Maori Electoral Option a further 
affidavit from the responsible Minister was received on appeal. 
The Court has also often applied section 42 of the Evidence Act 1908 to receive 
published material of the kind on which the affidavits submitted in Attorney-General v 
Prince and Gardner99 case were premised.  In Te Runanga o Muriwhenua Inc v Attorney-
General100 the Court held a report of the Waitangi Tribunal "to be admissible as a 
published book dealing with matters of public history".101 
ces.   
 
In the end, insofar as published works are concerned, the question is I suggest really 
one of judicial notice rather than admissibility of evidence.  The United States approach 
certainly recognises a significant relaxation of traditional limits.  In Brown v Board of 
Education102 thirty-two social scientists signed a "Social Science Statement" appended to 
the brief of appellants' counsel.  This summarised the general fund of psychological and 
social knowledge of the effects of the segregation of the black and white ra
Different Judges may be expected to wish to have greater or less regard to material of 
this kind, especially in interpretation of statutes.  It is important to reiterate that it is 
contextual in its nature and its importance in any case may be only peripheral or it may be 
seen as displaced by the plain language of an enactment.  Nevertheless, as my colleague Sir 
Kenneth Keith has pointed out, at this point our Courts have neither established theory nor 
well developed practice bearing on what evidence and wider material should be presented 
to the Court when issues of law involving broader issues of principle and policy have to be 
resolved.103  Sir Ivor is one of the few who have drawn the attention of judges, 
practitioners and academic lawyers to the gap.104 The basis on which judges should 
 
97  Creednz v Governor-General [1981] 1 NZLR 172, 182 (CA). 
98  Taiaroa v Minister of Justice  [1995] 1 NZLR 417, 441 (CA). 
99  Attorney-General v Prince and Gardner [1998] 1 NZLR 262 (CA). 
100  Te Runanga o Muriwhenua  Inc v Attorney-General [1990] 2 NZLR 641. 
101  Te Runanga o Muriwhenua  Inc, above, 653. 
102 Brown v Board of Education (1954) 347 US 483. 
103  Sir Kenneth Keith From Professing to Advising to Judging (unpublished paper, 1998) 9. 
104  Rt Hon Sir Ivor Richardson "Public Interest Litigation" [1995] 3 Waikato LR 9, 12. 
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receive extra-statutory contextual information of this kind nevertheless presently remains 
elusive in New Zealand. 
VII CONTROLLING PRESUMPTIONS 
What then of the canons of interpretation in 2002?  Willis, it will be recalled, took the 
view in 1937 that they had a "dual position as canons of legislative intent and weapons of 
judicial control."105  Frankfurter, in 1947 described them as "generalizations of 
experience".106  While in the abstract they rarely aroused controversy there were certainly 
difficulties when they competed and were in conflict. 
One development over the past forty years is that particular canons may now be said 
largely to have been superseded by the purposive approach, most notably that penal 
statutes and tax statutes should be construed strictly.  In the modern world such content is 
no longer regarded as in itself requiring that statutes be interpreted in a restrictive way.  
Parliament has indeed reinforced that common law development by enacting a specific, 
purposive principle of interpretation in the Income Tax Act 1994.  Section AA3 (as 
substituted in 1996) provides: 
AA3  Interpretation 
Principle of interpretation 
(1) The meaning of a provision of this Act is found by reading the words in context and, 
particularly, in light of the purpose provisions, the core provisions and the way in which 
the Act is organised. 
As Sir Kenneth Keith points out the final phrase could have been expressed simply as 
"the scheme of the Act".107  
Professor Taggart, writing on "Expropriation, Public Purpose and the Constitution"108 
suggests purposive interpretation competes with background norms Judges bring to bear 
in judging particular exercise of expropriatory power. That is also true over a wider field 
where legislation addresses areas touching on those values regarded as of fundamental 
importance to our society.  A striking recent example, in a judgment written by Richardson 
  
105  Professor John Willis "Statute Interpretation in a Nutshell" (1938) 16 Can Bar Rev 1, 18. 
106  Felix Frankfurter "Some Reflections on the Reaching of Statutes" (1947) Colum Law Rev 527, 544. 
107 Sir Kenneth Keith Sources of Law, Especially in Statutory Interpretation in Rick Bigwood (ed) Legal 
Method in New Zealand (Butterworths, Wellington, 2001) 77, 86. 
108  Professor Taggart "Expropriation, Public Purpose & the Constitution" in Christopher Forsyth 
and Ivan Hare (eds) The Golden Metwand and the Crooked Cord:  Essays on Public Law in Honour of 
Sir William Wade QC (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1998) 91, 105. 
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P for a Court which was unanimous on the point is Attorney-General v Choudry (No. 1).109  
The Full Court held that provisions in the NZ Security Intelligence Service Act 1969, which 
gave what had been thought by some within government to be wide powers to officers of 
the Security Intelligence Service to intercept communications, did not permit them to break 
into a dwellinghouse for that purpose.  There was nothing in the statutory language and 
scheme to justify going behind a restrictive reading of the grant of invasive powers.110 The 
fundamental value in issue was of course one that went back to Entick v Carrington.111  
In passing I note that the legislation was amended by the NZ Security Intelligence 
Service Amendment (No 2) Act 1999. The public policy question raised by the Court's 
decision was plainly one to be addressed, if at all, by Parliament affecting as it did basic 
common law provisions.   
Sir Ivor's judicial philosophy in such matters is reflected in an address he gave in 1984 
when he said:  "What is important is to recognise that the judges are not directly 
representative of our society in the same sense as are the politicians.  They should not be 
seen as a political force prepared to move into action to undermine the government of the 
day; and whether of the left or the right.  At the same time, the courts must stand between 
citizen and citizen and between the citizen and the state, and not abdicate responsibility for 
correcting the abuse complained of to other branches of government.  Parliament is then 
free at any time to deal with the matter for the future by appropriate legislation."112  
In NZ Stock Exchange v Commissioner of Inland Revenue113 the appellants sought to 
confine a statutory provision empowering the Commissioner to require production of 
information so that it applied only to a specified taxpayer whose tax affairs were under 
investigation.  The social value with which such a restricted interpretation of the power 
would accord was the confidentiality of relationships between the bankers and 
sharebrokers, who had been required to provide the information, and their clients. 
The Court of Appeal in a judgment delivered by Richardson J found that the scheme of 
the Act contained its own balancing of privacy interests and effective mechanisms for 
ascertaining liability for tax.  In this light the confidentiality of the relationships concerned 
  
109 Attorney-General v Choudry (No 1) [1999] 2 NZLR 582 (CA). 
110  Choudry (No 1), above, 592. 
111  Entick v Carrington (1765) 19 State Tr 1029; 95 ER 807 (CP). 
112 Rt Hon Sir Ivor Richardson "Judges as Policymakers" (1985) 15 VUWLR 46, 51.  See also R v 
Hines [1997] 3 NZLR 529 (CA) per Richardson P and Keith J. 
113 NZ Stock Exchange v Commissioner of Inland Revenue [1990] 3 NZLR 333 (CA); [1992] 3 NZLR 1 
(PC). 
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could not support a reading down of the plain language.114 The Privy Council agreed.  
Lord Templeman said of the implied limitation argument:115 
It is impossible to insert that limitation as a matter of statutory construction.  The limit could 
be inserted as a matter of policy only by a process of judicial legislation on the grounds that 
Parliament could not have intended to confer on the Commissioner a power so wide as not to 
be subject to such a limitation.  
In the area of fundamental rights Parliament has of course given statutory effect to a 
Bill of Rights principle of interpretation by enacting section 6 of the New Zealand Bill of 
Rights Act 1990 under which a tenable meaning consistent with rights and freedoms 
contained in the Bill of Rights is always to be preferred.  But beyond that the area of 
human rights the extent to which Courts revert to restrictive canons of interpretation in 
preference to a purposive approach has clearly diminished.  This appears to be the direct 
result of the firm establishment in New Zealand of the purposive principle of 
interpretation in statutory interpretation by the year 2000. 
VIII THE NEW LOOK SECTION 5(J) 
To bring the statutory position up to date I note that section 5(j) was repealed, and a 
more modern expression of the purposive interpretation direction substituted, in the 
Interpretation Act 1999.  In recommending the retention of a section 5(j) type of direction 
the Law Commission was persuaded by the democratic argument.  The declaratory 
statement emphasised the central position of statute law in our legal system and enhanced 
the likelihood of interpretation consistent with democratic theory.116  The present 
provision simply says: 
Ascertaining meaning of legislation 
(1) The meaning of an enactment must be ascertained in light of its text and in the light of its 
purpose. 
(2) The matters that may be considered in ascertaining the meaning of an enactment include 
the indications provided in the enactment. 
(3) Examples of those indications are preambles, the analysis, a table of contents, headings to 
Parts and sections, marginal notes, diagrams, graphics, examples and explanatory 
material, and the organisation and format of the enactment. 
  
114  NZ Stock Exchange, above, 338 (CA). 
115 NZ Stock Exchange, above, 4 (PC). 
116 New Zealand Law Commission A New Interpretation Act to Avoid "Prolixity and Tautology" 
(NZLC R17, Wellington, 1990). 
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It is important to bear in mind that the Interpretation Act is expressed in abbreviated 
and plain language with the aim of making statute law more accessible to the many non 
lawyers who must read it.  There is no reference to reading the text in its context in the 
new provision, although there was such a reference in the Law Commission's draft.117  The 
explanatory note to the Bill as introduced offers this explanation:118 
Clause 5 confirms the purposive approach to the interpretation of legislation inherent in section 
5(j) and adopted by the Courts in New Zealand.  The importance of purpose is recognised by 
including clause 5 as a separate clause in Part 2 of the Bill. 
    That clause does not, however, adopt the Law Commission's recommendation that the 
clause also refer to the context of the legislation.  There are 2 principal reasons for this.  First, 
the term "context" is imprecise.  Second, the discussion of the concept in the Law 
Commission's report (paras. 71 and 72) suggests a meaning that might well go beyond the 
approach of the Courts currently in interpreting legislation. 
A reading of the passages in the Law Commission report suggests the Government's 
concern was with the breadth of the context.  All that can perhaps be said for certain of this 
difficult explanation, however, is that the omission is not intended to alter the present 
dominant place of the purposive approach in the reading of New Zealand statutes.  As 
Professor Burrows has observed in any sensible process of interpretation context cannot be 
ignored.119  
IX CONCLUSION 
In New Zealand the Judges of the Court of Appeal had, by 2000, undoubtedly shifted 
the emphasis in statutory interpretation to focus their approach on the purpose of 
legislation while adhering to the judicial task of interpreting the words used.  In retrospect, 
Ward and Willis can be seen as largely vindicated for their criticisms.   
The purposive approach, as anticipated, has required greater reference to contextual 
material found outside the statute itself.  The limits of legitimate contextual reference are 
not yet defined – especially in the area of empirical material.  The purposive approach, 
however, is not the sole approach that New Zealand Judges apply.  Perceptions of 
community values remain a force in particular areas of legislation although not to the 
extent they were in 1960.  When they are in point they sometimes result in more literal 
interpretations.  The most important qualification of the purposive approach has of course 
been recognised by Parliament itself in section 6 of the Bill of Rights Act.   
  
117 New Zealand Law Commission The Format of Legislation (NZLC R27, Wellington, 1993) 4. 
118  Interpretation Bill 1997. 
119  John F Burrows, Statute Law in New Zealand (2ed, Butterworths, Wellington, 1999) 184. 
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The judicial leader this conference honours has been at the forefront of the 
development of the purposive approach to interpretation and has made a major 
contribution to judicial technique in reading statutes. 
